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EXPANDING PATENT LAW’S
CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION

Brian J. Love*
James C. Yoon†
93 Boston University Law Review (forthcoming 2013)
Abstract: Recent years have seen a marked increase in patent suits filed
primarily for nuisance value. Non-practicing patent holders like Innovatio,
Lodsys, PACid, and many others have collectively sued thousands of
alleged patent infringers in cases that generally settle for less than the cost
of mounting even the slightest defense. Suits like these overwhelming
target the numerous resellers and end users of allegedly infringing
products, rather than the accused products’ original manufacturer. More
individual defendants means more lawyers, more discovery, and, thus,
more litigation costs to inflate settlement amounts. With legislative reform
unlikely at present, doctrinal solutions to this problem are needed now
more than ever. This article proposes one candidate: the customer suit
exception. This doctrine allows courts to stay patent suits filed against
“customer” defendants pending the outcome of litigation between the
patentee and the accused technology’s manufacturer. Doing so drastically
reduces patentees’ ability to impose litigation costs and, moreover, hands
the reins of defense to the party best suited to challenge and value the
patent-in-suit. Unfortunately, case law applying the exception has become
increasingly rigid over time and, today, is incredibly difficult to satisfy.
This article explores the history and evolution of the customer suit
exception, explains why the doctrine is so rarely invoked and applied, and
argues that courts should stay customer suits more frequently in order to
promote litigation outcomes that reflect the value of asserted patents, not
the cost of defense.
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INTRODUCTION

Exploitation of inefficiencies in the patent system may be at an all-time
high. Suits filed by non-practicing entities (NPEs)—companies that
acquire patents solely to license them, not to protect products1—are on the
rise.2 So are the size of litigation costs,3 settlement amounts, and potential
damages awards 4 that innovators who actually commercialize technology
face as a result of these suits.
1

The NPE—or patent “troll”—ecosystem is complex. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al.,
Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (dividing NPE patentholders into twelve categories, rather
than grouping all NPEs together under the rubric of “troll”). Some commentators have
developed alternative terminology intended to single out a subset of “trollish” NPEs.
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) (defining “patent
assertion entity” (PAE) as an entity that uses patents primarily to obtain license fees
rather than to support the development or transfer of technology); Sara Jeruss et al., The
America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012) (using the similar term “patent monetization
entity” (PME)). In this paper, we primarily discuss a subset of NPEs defined by
behavior—namely, a penchant for filing suits primarily for nuisance value—rather than
by their corporate structure or the provenance of their patents.
2
See Jeruss, et al., supra note 1, at 365 (finding, in a study of 100 patent suits filed each
year from 2007 to 2011, that the percentage attributable to NPEs was roughly 22% in
2007, 27% in 2008, 33% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011); Colleen V. Chien,
Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1604 (2009) (finding, in a study of 2,300
high-tech patent suits filed between 2000 and 2008, that NPEs filed 10% of all suits
initiated between 2000-2001, 16% between 2002-2003, 16% between 2004-2005, and
20% between 2006-2008).
3
According to a survey of law firms conducted by the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, median patent litigation costs roughly doubled between 2001 and 2009,
and doubled again between 2009 and 2011. Compare AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001, at 85 (reporting
that in cases with $25 million or more potentially at stake the median cost per party from
pleadings through discovery was $1.5 million) with AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009, at I-129 (reporting that the
same figure had increased to $3 million in costs) and AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 at I-155-56
(reporting that it increased again to $6 million). See also Matt Miller, Are You in Good
Hands When IP Mayhem Strikes, DISCOVER READY, June 5, 2012, available at
http://discoverready.com/blog/are-you-in-good-hands-when-ip-mayhem-strikes/ (reporting
that the cost of patent litigation has increased about 48% increase since 2001).
4
Between 2006 and 2010, the median NPE damages award was more than twice as large
as the median award to practicing patentholders. PWC PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 2011,
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2011-patent-
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Satisfactory solutions to this problem have so far proven illusory, or at
least politically unpalatable. 5 Patent reform legislation enacted in 2011
has made, at best, superficial progress in stemming the tide of NPE
litigation.6 And additional, meaningful legislative reform doesn’t appear
litigation-study.pdf (finding that the median NPE award was $6.9 million and the median
practicing-patentee award was $3.4 million). Between 1995 and 2000, the median NPE
damages award was 23% larger than the median award to practicing-companies. Id.
2012 was the most profitable year to date for large, publicly-traded NPE Acacia Research
Corporation. Press Release, Acacia Research Corp. (Feb. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.acaciaresearch.com/pr/0221134thqtrfinancials2012.pdf.
5
Recently proposed legislation creating a fee-shifting scheme to deter frivolous NPE suits
asserting high-tech patents died in committee without a public hearing. Saving HighTech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012, H.R. 6245, 112th Cong.
(2012), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6245. Few believe it
ever had a legitimate chance of becoming law. See, e.g., Lisa Schuchman, Finding
Creative Solutions for Fighting 'Patent Troll' Lawsuits, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Nov. 30,
2012,
at
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202579781960&Finding_
Creative_Solutions_for_Fighting_Patent_Troll_Lawsuits&slreturn=20130118140841
(reporting that a panel of experts believed the bill was “unlikely to pass”). Moreover,
though patent reform legislation was enacted in 2011, it passed congressional scrutiny
only after virtually all serious reforms were stripped from the bill. See, e.g., Joe Mullin,
Senate Passes Patent Reform, After Stripping Out All Controversial Measures,
PAIDCONTENT, March 10, 2011, at http://paidcontent.org/2011/03/10/419-senate-passespatent-reform-after-stripping-out-all-controversial-measu/.
6
Under section 299 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), patentees may no
longer sue multiple, unrelated defendants in a single patent suit. 35 U.S.C. § 299
(“[P]arties that are accused infringers may be joined in one action as defendants . . . only
if . . . questions of fact common to all defendants . . . will arise . . . . [and] infringers
may not be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their
actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each have infringed the
patent or patents in suit.”). Hopes that this change in law would increase the cost of
litigation for NPEs, and thereby reduce the quantity of NPE infringement claims, have so
far proven unfounded. NPEs now file multiple identical suits, rather one suit with
multiple defendants. See, e.g., Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2012
WL 3307942 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012) (noting a rise in “serially file[d] multiple singledefendant (or defendant group) cases involving the same underlying patents”); Charles R.
Macedo et al., AIA’s Impact On Multidefendant Patent Litigation: Part 2, Law360.com
(Oct. 26, 2012), at http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/387458/aia-s-impact-onmultidefendant-patent-litigation-part-2 (noting that NPEs are exploring creative avenues
to circumvent AIA joinder rules, including filing multiple nearly-identical complaints).
As a result, the new joinder rules have markedly increased the number of patent suits
with little change at all in the quantity of individual companies accused of infringement.
See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation at the Dec. 10, 2012
D.O.J./F.T.C.
Hearing
on
PAEs,
24,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (reporting that the number
of NPE-filed suits has risen sharply since the AIA’s enactment, while the number of
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likely at present because, though there is widespread agreement that
something should be done, industry factions cannot agree on what should
be done and at whose expense.7
Much of the disagreement over the “patent troll” problem is
definitional. NPEs come in various shapes and sizes, 8 and not all are
widely viewed as bad actors. 9 One thing that isn’t seriously debated,
however, is the utility of patentholders that specialize in nuisance-value
patent litigation. No one champions these “bottom feeders”10 of the NPE

accused infringers has remained roughly similar); Maya M. Eckstein, et al., The
(Unintended) Consequences of the AIA Joinder Provision § IV.D.i, AIPLA Spring
Meeting,
Austin,
Tex.,
May
10-12,
2012, at
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/papers/SM/2012_Spring/Documents/2012SM
-Materials/Eckstein_Paper.pdf (showing a 64% increase in the rate of patent litigation
filings in all district courts post-AIA).
7
Even defenders of the NPE business model generally agree that at least some
patentholders abuse the system. See Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A14 (“Perhaps the biggest myth is . . . ‘patent trolls’ . . .
who supposedly manipulate the patent system in a shady way. It does happen . . . . A
tiny minority of patent suits are due to bad actors, but it’s hardly a crisis.”); Michael C.
Smith, “Patent Pirates” Only Exist in Neverland, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 11, 2004
(acknowledging that “patent litigation can price small defendants out of being able to
defend themselves on the merits”); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for
Imaginary Creatures: A Comments Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll,
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 166 (2007) (arguing that “[i]nstead of hindering legitimate
intellectual property businesses, the courts and legislature should focus on the main
problem with patent litigation—patent quality”).
8
For example, though universities, failed startups, individual inventors, and industry
consortia are NPEs strictly speaking, each group has unique motivations and
sophistication. Allison, et. al., supra note 1, at 2.
9
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008) (arguing that universities are not “trolls”); Chien,
Of Trolls, supra note 2, at 1578 (arguing that individual inventors also fall outside the
scope of patentees that deserve the label “troll”); Chief Judge Randall R. Rader,
Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Judicial Conference on the State of Patent
Litigation (Sep. 27, 2011) (“[T]he NPE designation sweeps in some unintended ‘culprits’
like universities and research clinics and can also extend to almost every corporation and
business because they practice only a fraction of their patent portfolio.”).
10
David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64
ALA. L. REV. 335, 369 (2012) (describing firms that are at the “bottom” of the
contingent fee market); see also Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 21 (2003) (testimony of David Simon) (defining patent trolls as
“patent system bottom feeders” who buy “improvidently-granted patents from distressed
companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses”).

5
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ecosystem: a class of patentees that overwhelmingly acquire old, 11
extremely weak 12 patents and assert them against the numerous,
unsophisticated purchasers (rather than manufacturers) of allegedly
infringing products in suits that typically settle for less than defendants’
anticipated litigation costs.
Recent years have seen a spike in high profile patent assertion of this
sort. In the last two years, NPE Innovatio has asserted its patent rights—
rights the company alleges cover any use of a Wi-Fi network—against
hundreds of small businesses like coffee shops and hotels that offer
wireless network access to patrons, 13 invariably offering to settle for an
amount far below the cost of mounting even the slightest defense. 14
Another patent-holder, Lodsys, has sued scores of companies, asserting
patents allegedly covering (among other things) mobile “apps” that enable
users to make purchases on mobile devices,15 each time offering to settle
for running royalties substantially below those at stake in a typical patent
suit. 16 Other examples abound. Operating through multiple shell

11

See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (finding that NPEs are responsible for about two-thirds of all patent
suits and four-fifths of all infringement claims litigated within the last three years of the
asserted patent’s term).
12
See John R. Allison, et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689, 694 (2011) (finding that between 2000 and 2010, NPEs
that asserted the same patent in eight or more cases settled almost 90% of the time and,
when forced to litigate to a judgment, lost more than 90% of the time).
13
In addition, Innovatio has threatened thousands more with suit. Amended Complaint at
19, Cisco Systems Inc. v. Innovatio IP Ventures LLC, No. 1:11cv09309 (N.D. Ill. filed
Dec 28, 2011) (“Innovatio has sent more than 8,000 threatening letters to licensing
targets [end users of Wi-Fi technology] in all 50 states”); Ashby Jones, Cisco Calls
Patent
Trolls
Racketeers,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Nov.
11,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578113082258844080.html.
14
Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate Hotels,
The Patent Examiner, Sept. 30, 2011, http://patentexaminer.org/2011/09/innovatiosinfringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-corporate-hotels (noting that Innovatio demands a
few thousand dollars to settle when the typical patent suit settles for six- or seven-figure
dollar amounts).
15
Lodsys - Piling It On, But To What Purpose, GROKLAW, July 22, 2011,
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20110722082612424 (noting that as of July
2011 Lodsys had asserted its patents against 40 entities).
16
David Ruddock, Patent Trolls: What Is Lodsys Actually Asking App Developers To Pay?
You
Might
Be
Surprised,
ANDROID
POLICE,
Nov.
2,
2011,
http://www.androidpolice.com/2011/11/02/patent-trolls-what-is-lodsys-actually-asking-
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companies, NPE Project Paperless has threatened to sue an untold number
of small offices for infringing patents that allegedly cover copiers
equipped to email scanned files.17 Personal Audio has similarly threatened
end users of podcasting software.18 PACid has sued more than 50 retailers
that sell products allegedly infringing patent rights to data encryption
technology.19 And several NPEs, including E-Data,20 Soverain Software,21
and Clear with Computers,22 have collectively sued well over one hundred
online retailers for infringing patents that allegedly cover some aspect of
e-commerce.
In fact, small companies—not tech giants—are the
predominant targets of NPE lawsuits.23
Though enabled by many factors, 24 nuisance value patent assertion
wouldn’t be possible without a large population of potential defendants.25
app-developers-to-pay-you-might-be-surprised (noting that Lodsys demands only 0.575%
in royalties while royalties in a typical patent case fall between one and four percent).
17
See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—For Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA,
Jan. 2, 2013, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-forusing-scanners/.
18
See, e.g., Julie Samuels, Podcasting Community Faces Patent Troll Threat; EFF Wants
to
Help,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
Feb.
5,
2013,
at
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/podcasting-community-faces-patent-troll-threat-effwants-help (“So far, Personal Audio has sued some pretty high-profile and beloved
podcasts, like the Adam Carolla Show and HowStuffWorks. It also sent its threatening
letters demanding a license to numerous podcasters, like Majority Report’s Sam Seder”).
19
See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Best Buy, Dozens More Sued Over Encryption Patents,
IPINVESTMENTS
GROUP,
July
28,
2010,
at
http://ipinvestmentsgroup.com/index_files/PACid-7.28.2010.pdf.
20
See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 517 (2003) (noting that E-Data, a company
that “owns a patent which arguably covers financial transactions on the Internet,”
reportedly sent demand letters to 75,000 alleged infringers before suing forty-one
companies for patent infringement).
21
See, e.g., Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and Saved
Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 27, 2013, at http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-online-retail/.
22
See, e.g., John S. Pratt & Bonnie M. Grant, Beware the Trolls: Explorers or
Buccaneers, PATENT WORLD, Nov. 2008, at 18 (noting that Clear with Computers sued
47 defendants in one suit alone).
23
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls (working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251 (finding that 55% of
companies sued by NPEs have annual gross revenues below $10 million).
24
The nuisance-value troll business model thrives in the U.S. for a number of reasons.
For one, unlike much of the world, the U.S. court system generally does not require the
party who lost a lawsuit to pay the winner’s legal fees as a matter of course. See, e.g.,
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993). Moreover, though the law permits

7
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Fortunately for NPEs, the Patent Act provides a ready supply. Under
section 271(a), any entity that “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells”
subject matter covered by a patent claim is an infringer.26 Patentholders,
thus, generally have the option to sue anywhere on the supply chain, from
the original manufacturer of the infringing product all the way down to the
retailer or end-user. Patentholders who aim lower on the supply chain
generally can sue more individual parties and, thus, impose more litigation
costs. 27 For patentholders whose rights are worth relatively little
them to do so, courts have proven exceedingly reluctant to sanction patentees for bringing
arguably “frivolous” or “exceptional” lawsuits. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1530 (2001) (“Unfortunately,
the patent law makes it very difficult for a prevailing defendant to obtain an award of
attorney's fees. The statute requires the case to be ‘exceptional.’”). Courts’ reluctance to
sanction patentees likely stems from the fact that it is incredibly difficult to determine the
scope of patent claims and, thus, pronounce any given infringement allegation objectively
baseless. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (finding that the Federal
Circuit reversed 34.5% of district court claim construction rulings appealed between
1996 and 2003). See also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s
Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting
similar numbers).
25
From a patent holder’s perspective, it is economically worthwhile to bring suit if the
“expected” value of litigation is greater than its “expected” litigation costs. In suits
involving “weak” or “nuisance” patents, patent holders must minimize the expected costs
of litigation in order to maximize the expected value of litigation. See Ranganath
Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economical Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163, 165-166 (2008). One way patent
holders minimize expected litigation costs by using contingency fee arrangements. Id. at
166. Another way patentholders minimize expected litigation costs per defendant is by
suing a large number of defendants together in the same action. Id. at 167-168 (noting
that from the standpoint of a nuisance patent plaintiff, many litigation costs are
substantially the same whether there is one defendant or many).
26
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Unlike general tort law, patent law does not permit accused
infringers to implead those who might be jointly and severally liable for the infringement.
See Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 98
(2011) (“Under tort law’s theory of contribution, when one party is sued, it can implead
other parties that may be jointly and severally liable and ask that they pay their fair share
of any judgment. Although contribution theory has spread to numerous areas of the law,
patent law is not among them. Thus, when a manufacturer is sued for patent infringement,
it cannot seek contribution from the component supplier that included the patented
technology in its component.”).
27
Each customer defendant independently bears the risk of litigation. The defendant’s
expected value of litigation is a negative cost, which can be calculated in the following
manner: cost = attorney fees + case costs + indirect employee costs + (probability of
patent holder win * judgment for patent holder). Richard A. Kamprath, Gaming the
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compared to the costs of litigation—roughly between $1 to $3 million for
even suits of modest complexity28—serial nuisance filings against resellers
or users quickly becomes more profitable than litigating on the merits
against the original manufacturer.
Not even manufacturers, who at first blush may seem like beneficiaries
of this practice, like the current state of affairs. Widespread use of
indemnification agreements means that manufacturers often remain on the
hook for their customers’ settlements.29 Manufacturers also legitimately
fear loss of good will with existing customers and lost business in the
future if they fail to stand up for customers accused of infringement.
Cisco, Motorola, and Netgear jumped into the fray with Innovatio,30 and
Apple fought Lodsys. 31 But neither company was able to stop its NPE
adversary from continuing to file suits, continuing to rack up alleged
infringers’ legal bills, and continuing to accept settlement checks from
defendants hoping to triage their budgets.32
This unfortunate reality raises the common sense question: Shouldn’t
patent law incorporate some mechanism permitting companies higher in

Patent System: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation Economics and Possible Solutions, at
*23 (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577906. A patent defendant
will pay litigation costs no matter what the outcome of the patent lawsuit, and in addition
may pay damages. This is a strong incentive to settle the case as early as possible –
without regard to the merits of the underlying case. Id. at *23-24.
28
See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at I-155-56.
29
See Virginia DeMarchi, Contractual Indemnity Obligations for Patent Infringement
Claims, A.B.A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION, vol. 21, no. 3 (Spring 2010), at 1
(“indemnity provisions allocating the risk of infringement of intellectual property rights
are increasingly common in commercial agreements”); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 2.01 (2013).
30
Mike Masnick, Cisco, Motorola, Netgear Team Up To Expose Wifi Patent Bully,
TECHDIRT, Oct. 9, 2012, at http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/?company=innovatio.
31
Julie Samuels, Apple Steps Into Lodsys Litigation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, June 10, 2011, at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/06/apple-stepslodsys-litigation.
32
See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, Apple Scourge Lodsys Continues Patent Rampage Against
Developers,
Corporations,
GIGAOM,
May
22,
2012,
at
http://gigaom.com/2012/05/22/apple-scourge-lodsys-continues-patent-rampage-againstdevelopers-corporations (noting that Lodsys continued to offer “licensing solutions” to
small app makers even after Apple’s intervention); Docket Entry No. 185, Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC vs. ABP Corp., No. 1:11-cv-01638 (N.D. Ill.) (denying as moot
defendants’ motion to stay under the customer suit exception because the instant had been
consolidated with ten others).

9
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the supply chain to step in and stem the tide of patent filings against their
customers? Unbeknownst to many,33 patent law already does.
Under the co-called “customer suit exception,” courts can stay
litigation filed against a customer until after the resolution of a later-filed
declaratory judgment action initiated by the accused product’s
manufacturer. The doctrine recognizes that it is the manufacturer, not a
purchaser or mere user of technology, who is the “true party in interest”
when that technology stands accused of patent infringement. 34 Unlike
customers and end-users who frequently view patent suits as one-off
affairs, manufacturers are often in a financial position to fight would-be
nuisance suits to adjudication. 35
Also, compared to customers,
manufacturers have a relative advantage litigating patent suits because they
generally have greater knowledge of the industry, the prior art, and the
patented invention’s value.36
Unfortunately, parties rarely invoke the doctrine and courts apply it, if
at all, very narrowly. As a result, the customer suit exception has long
existed in a state of relative disuse. Since the 1960s, the doctrine has been
raised in fewer than seventy cases total, and has been applied in just
nineteen.37 The Federal Circuit has discussed the doctrine just five times
in the last thirty year, and has affirmed its application only once.38
33

The doctrine is so obscure it has apparently never been the subject of a single law
review article.
34
Rates Tech., Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., 1995 WL 438954 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995).
35
See infra, Part II.A.
36
See infra, Parts II.B-II.C.
37
Customer Suit Exception Dataset (on file with the authors) [Note: Cases could be cited
in an Appendix, instead]. Even this modest figure is inflated by numerous cases in which
the exception was raised erroneously (or at least hopelessly). See, e.g., Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. v. S3 Graphics Co., Ltd., No. No. 11–CV-965, 2011 WL 5402667, at *2
(D. Del. Nov. 8, 2011) (declining to stay a “nearly-completed ITC [customer] action in
favor of a newly-filed district court [manufacturer] action”); Edizone, LLC v. ScheringPlough Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. No. 10–CV–855, 2011 WL 1559944 (D. Utah Apr.
25, 2011) (declining to apply the customer suit exception when the manufacturer was
already a party in the first-filed action); AG Leader Tech., Inc. v. NTech Indus. Inc.,
574 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (declining to apply the exception when the
manufacturer’s suit was the first-filed suit); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 08-CV-0279, 2008 WL 3472181 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2008) (declining to
apply the exception when the manufacturer’s suit was the first-filed suit).
38
Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming application of
the customer suit exception); Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v.
Toshiba Am. Info. Sys. Inc., 297 F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that partially
staying the first-filed action was not in the interest of efficiency); Kahn v. Gen. Motors
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This article sheds new light on the rarely-used doctrine, explains why
it is so rarely invoked and applied, and argues that courts should stay
customer suits more frequently in order to promote litigation outcomes
that reflect the value of asserted patents, not the cost of defense. Part I
sets forth the doctrine underlying the customer suit exception and explains
why parties so rarely raise it and courts so rarely apply it. Part II explains
why it is advantageous for manufacturers, rather than purchasers or users,
of allegedly infringing products to defend against patent suits. Finally,
Part III proposes reforms to the customer suit exception that, if
implemented, would permit manufacturers to take charge of suits filed
against their legions of customers.
I. THE CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION
Courts have inherent power to stay overlapping litigation for the sake
of judicial economy.39 In carrying out this power, courts generally permit
the suit filed first in time to proceed and stay related suits that were
subsequently filed. 40 Though the general practice of staying duplicative
litigation obviously advances policy goals like efficiency and comity, 41
Corp., 889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reversing application of the customer suit
exception because the second-filed action would not resolve all issues between the
parties); see also Spread Spectrum Screening LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that an order to stay was not an appealable interlocutory
order, in part, because the district court did not apply the customer suit exception); Tegic
Commc’n Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (holding that, on the facts of the case, that the customer suit exception “does
not override the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment”).
39
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is
incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigant.”).
40
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Adjustment Bd., First Div., 422 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th
Cir. 1970) (noting that this will avoid unnecessarily burdening courts and possible
embarrassment from conflicting results). The first-filed doctrine was established by the
Supreme Court in Smith v. McIver, and has been flexibly applied to promote judicial
economy and the interests of justice through avoidance of repeated or vexatious litigation.
Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. 532 (1824) (noting concurrent suits in law and equity courts
should be resolved by the court with possession of the first action).
41
See Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737-38 (1st Cir. 1977) (“At the
root of the preference for a manufacturer's declaratory judgment action is the recognition
that, in reality, the manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer suit. In spite of
[Plaintiff’s] vigorous protests to the contrary, it is a simple fact of life that a
manufacturer must protect its customers, either as a matter of contract, or good business,
or in order to avoid the damaging impact of an adverse ruling against its products.”).
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courts have struggled to justify the first-filed rule itself on policy grounds42
and, accordingly, have recognized exceptions.43
One, applicable only in patent litigation, is the so-called “customer suit
exception.” When the technology and parties involved in a patent suit
satisfy certain criteria, the customer suit exception allows a later-filed
declaratory judgment action brought by the manufacturer of an accused
product to take “precedence over a [earlier-filed] suit by the patent owner
against customers of the manufacturer.”44 In other words, courts applying
this exception stay earlier-filed patent cases against customers pending the
resolution of the manufacturer’s later-filed declaratory judgment action
against the patentholder.45

42

See Codex, 553 F.2d at 737 (“While the first-filed rule may ordinarily be a prudent one,
it is so only because it is sometimes more important that there be a rule than that the rule
be particularly sound.”).
43
Other exceptions to the first-filed rule arise when: the first-filed action is an
anticipatory declaratory judgment suit, see, e.g., Lawrence D. Graham, The Personal
Jurisdiction Effect of Notifications of Infringement, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 858, 868-69 (1996), or the first-filed action was initiated for forum shopping
purposes or otherwise in bad faith, see Maximum Human Performance, Inc. v. Dymatize
Enters., Inc., No. 09-CV-235, 2009 WL 2778104 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2009).
44
Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Courts also make
an exception to this general rule when the forum of a later-filed action is more convenient
or just. See Horton Archery, LLC v. Am. Hunting Innovations, LLC, No. 09-CV-1604,
2010 WL 395572, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2010) (“The Federal Circuit has recognized
two exceptions to the first-to-file rule, the customer-suit exception and a discretionary
determination based on the convenience and suitability of competing forums.”).
45
Spread Spectrum Screening LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). Often, the manufacturer’s declaratory judgment action and the patentholder’s
infringement action are filed in separate forums, and courts have long recognized that the
“customer-suit” cases frequently involve “forum shopping” by both the patent holder and
the manufacturer:
There appears to be a general attitude among the patent bar that the Second
Circuit is most uncharitable to patents. Consequently, a party desiring to have a
patent declared invalid will probably seek to sue here, while a party suing to
enforce its patent in an infringement suit will probably bring it elsewhere, even
to the point of suing a customer of the infringer instead of the direct
infringer. . . . I believe that a litigant, whether a swift first or as a prompt
retaliator, is open to the charge of forum shopping wherever he chooses a forum
with slight connection to the factual circumstances surrounding his suit.
Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(transferring the earlier filed case in Southern District of New York to later filed case in
New Jersey on ground that “the business activities of all the parties of all the parties are
more closely associated with New Jersey”).
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In its first few decades of existence,46 courts applied the customer suit
exception relatively liberally, justifying its application on efficiency
grounds by reference to res judicata and claim preclusion.47 Resolution of
a case between the patentee and manufacturer of the accused device is
more likely to resolve the question of infringement definitively because,
after a final resolution of that case, res judicata will generally bar future
suits between the patentee and the manufacturer or its customers. 48 By
contrast, a final judgment in a patent suit against one customer does not
bar suits against other customers or the manufacturer.49
Courts also stressed during this time that the manufacturer of the
accused technology, not customers who merely purchased or used it, is
“the true defendant in a customer suit” since it “must protect its customers,
either as a matter of contract, or good business, in order to avoid the
damaging impact of an adverse ruling against its products.”50 Accordingly,
courts reasoned, it makes sense as a matter of policy to give

46

The modern customer suit exception—i.e., staying a first-filed customer suit in favor of
a later-filed manufacturer suit—first appeared in the 1960s. See Delamere Co. v. TaylorBell Co., 199 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (staying an earlier-filed customer action
in favor of a suit filed by the manufacturer twenty days later); William Gluckin & Co. v.
Int'l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming a preliminary injunction
staying a first-filed customer suit in favor of a manufacturer suit against the patentee).
The doctrine has roots in even earlier cases expressing a preference for manufacturer
suits. See, e.g., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929)
(explaining that when patent suits are brought against both the manufacturer of the
allegedly infringing goods and the manufacturer’s customers, the customer suits should
generally be stayed pending an outcome in the manufacturer’s suit).
47
Delamere, 199 F. Supp. at 57 (noting that a decision involving the manufacturer
“would settle the issue finally and prevent further suits”). In addition to res judicata and
claim preclusion, the patent law doctrine of “exhaustion” generally prevents a patentee
from licensing its rights at more than one level of the supply chain. See Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (holding that the
authorized sale of an article substantially embodying a patent exhausts the patent holder’s
rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking the patent law to control post sale use
of the article).
48
Id.
49
Id. (noting that a ruling in the “customer suit would not be res judicata against
allegedly infringing manufacturer, and a decree against the patent would still leave the
patent owner free to sue other customers”).
50
Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737-738 (1st Cir. 1977); see
also Delamere Co. v. Taylor-Bell Co., 199 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (noting
that the manufacturer is the “party most interested” in a patent suit against one of its
customers).
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manufacturers, whose incentives in litigation might diverge from those of
its customers, the reins of defense against claims of infringement.
However, over time (and particularly in the last twenty years)
jurisprudence related to the exception has become increasingly restrictive.
For one, under current law, application of the customer suit exception
turns solely on an analysis of judicial economy. As interpreted by the
Federal Circuit, “the guiding principles in the customer suit exception
cases are efficiency and judicial economy,” not the consideration of other
factors concerning the customers’ and manufacturers’ relative suitability as
defendants.51
Further, current case law recognizes an exceptionally narrow set of
circumstances under which applying the customer suit exception would
conserve judicial resources. Federal Circuit precedent sets forth three
factors to determine the exception’s applicability: (1) whether customer
defendants are “mere resellers” of the manufacturer’s product; (2)
whether the customers agree to be bound by any decision in the
manufacturer’s case; and (3) whether the manufacturer is the sole source
of the infringing products.52 By design, these factors collectively limit the
customer suit exception to cases in which resolution of one manufacturer
declaratory judgment action would completely resolve all pre-existing
customer suits.53
Together these factors also all but render the customer suit exception a
dead letter. The first factor excludes cases in which customer defendants
incorporate the manufacturer’s product into a larger device—for example,
as in Apeldyn v. Sony, when customer defendants install the
manufacturer’s allegedly infringing LCD panels into their own brand
name consumer electronics.54 The third excludes cases in which customer
defendants purchased from more than a single manufacturer—for example,
in Emerson Electric v. Black & Decker, where the customer defendant

51

Tegic Commc’n Corp. v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
52
Id.
53
Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he primary
question is whether the issues and parties are such that the disposition of one case would
be dispositive of the other . . .”).
54
Apeldyn Corp. v. Sony Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (D. Del. 2012) (declining to
apply the customer suit exception because Sony is “more than a mere reseller of goods”).
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purchased allegedly infringing workbenches for resale from two different
suppliers.55
In today’s high tech economy where complex devices like computers
and consumer electronics top the market, it is hard to imagine many cases
that would satisfy both requirements. Due to increasing complexity and
ever-shorter product lifecycles, few brand-name companies possess the
manpower and expertise to manufacturer their own products.56 As a result,
high-tech products—the dominant source of both issued patents and patent
suits 57 —are overwhelmingly constructed (at least in part) using discrete
components sourced from multiple manufacturers.58
55

Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1979)
(declining to apply the customer suit exception to stay a customer suit against Sears, in
favor of a manufacturer suit against Emerson, because Sears previously purchases
allegedly infringing workbenches from another supplier).
56
Gijsbert van Lient, Subcontracting in Electronics: From Contract Manufacturers to
Providers of Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS), at *6 (Int’l Labor Office Working
Paper No. 249, 2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/publication/wcms_161177.pdf (noting that brand-name
companies can no longer manufacture their products on their own because of “the
intensely competitive nature of the electronics industry, the ever increasing complexity
and sophistication of electronic products . . .and the shorter product lifecycles”).
57
High-tech patents have dominated the patent landscape for more than two decades. See
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 93 (2002) (finding that patents falling within the categories
“computer-related,”
“semiconductors,”
“electronics,”
“software,”
and
“communications-related” collectively account for about 53% of all patents issued during
the 1990s). By one estimate, one in six active U.S. patents relates to smartphone
technology. Daniel O’Connor, One in Six Active U.S. Patents Pertain to the Smartphone,
DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT, Oct. 17, 2012, at http://www.projectdisco.org/intellectual-property/one-in-six-active-u-s-patents-pertain-to-the-smartphone/.
Not surprisingly, high-tech patents are also the dominant source of patent suits. See
Love, supra note 11, at *37 (finding that about 65% of patents litigated by NPEs are
high-tech patents, as are about 42% of patents litigated by product-producing companies);
James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, at *12, Tbl. 2 (Boston
University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-45, Sep. 19, 2011) (finding that 62%
of patents litigated by NPEs between 1990 and 2010 were “software patents” and 75%
covered “computer and communications technology.”).
58
Today, the component parts of brand-name products are generally sourced from
multiple manufacturers. For example, Apple’s iPad 2 includes components sources from
at least ten vendors. Simon Foxman, 10 Public Companies That Have Parts In The New
iPad,
BUSINESS
INSIDER,
March
16,
2012,
available
at
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-companies-that-made-parts-for-the-newipad-2012-3?op=1. Similarly, Samsung’s Galaxy Tab includes components sourced
from at least nine vendors. Allan Yogasingam, Inside the Samsung Galaxy Tab: Taking
On
The
iPad,
EE
TIMES,
Dec.
13,
2010,
available
at
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II. MANUFACTURERS ARE THE “TRUE PARTY IN INTEREST”

The Federal Circuit’s current, rigid stance on the doctrine both
overstates the costs and understates the benefits of applying the customer
suit exception more frequently. First, on the cost side of the ledger,
existing case law takes an unnecessarily myopic view of judicial economy
by considering only the doctrine’s impact on already-filed suits. Broadly
viewed, however, revival of the customer suit exception promises to
substantially reduce court dockets by discouraging future patent suits filed
for nuisance value. Second, on the benefit side, current case law fails to
take into account other socially-desirable results of nudging patent defense
up the supply chain. In particular, compared to their downstream
customers, manufacturers are better suited to both invalidate erroneously
issued patents and properly value valid ones.
A. Manufacturers Have Incentive to Fight Nuisance Suits
The Federal Circuit’s present test for weighing the customer suit
exception’s impact on judicial economy fails to strike a socially optimal
balance because it fails to consider customers’ and manufacturers’ relative
incentives to litigate infringement claims.
Compared to individual
customers, manufacturers have more reason to litigate patent suits, even
nuisance suits, to a final adjudication. Accordingly, liberal application of
the customer suit exception would discourage weak patent suits and, thus,
promises to conserve judicial economy.
Customer defendants rationally view patent litigation through the prism
of their own costs and benefits, without regard to the best interests of their
competitors. Absent coordination, 59 customers faced with infringement
http://www.eetimes.com/design/communications-design/4211447/Inside-the-SamsungGalaxy-Tab--Taking-on-the-iPad-semiconductor?pageNumber=0. Manufacturers likewise
generally work for multiple brand-name companies. See van Lient, supra note 56, at 10
(noting, for example, that “Hon Hai Foxconn counts among its clients: Apple, H-P, Intel,
Dell, Lenovo, Nokia and Motorola”). Third-party manufacturers are presently active in
the production of communications devices (e.g., mobile phones and networking
equipment), personal and business computers (e.g., data storage devices), and consumer
electronics (e.g., gaming systems). Id. at 11.
59
Co-defendants are permitted to share information and litigation expenses, but are
prohibited from coordinating with respect to settlement negotiations. See Mark A.
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L.
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allegations are incentivized to settle for as little as possible and point the
patentee in the direction of its competition, whom it has a strong incentive
to see sued and forced to pay as much or more in costs and royalties.60
Manufacturer defendants, on the other hand, view patent suits with a
larger constituency in mind: its entire population of customers, including
all current and future customers. Thus, manufacturers that sell to a widerange of customers and that plan to continue developing products in the
field of the asserted patent, have a vested interest in resolving patent
disputes in a forward-looking manner to (1) protect all its customers and
(2) maximize its future freedom of operation and its profitability. As such,
a manufacturer is less likely than any individual customer to let the
expected legal cost associated with a single patent case drive its decision to
fight or license the asserted patent.

REV. 1889, 1940 (2002); Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 459 (3d Cir.
1966). Efficiency gains from information and expense sharing are often offset by other
inefficiencies associated with large suits, including the difficulties inherent in
coordinating multiple parties and lawyers. See, e.g., Michael M. Markman, Getting
Ahead in the Changing Patent Litigation Marketplace: Thinking About a New Toolkit for
Pre‐Suit Coordination of Patent Joint Defense Efforts, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, vol. 5,
no. 28 (2011), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/2ad48d32-3210-4cd99b73-d6cdb2c72948/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2d69f7d0-0cab-49a4-ad9ee3f7759828e8/bloomberg%20law_markman_article7.7.11.pdf (“It can be difficult to
create a frictionless approach to collaboration that also limits transaction costs. ‘Herding
the cats’ can be time consuming and inefficient . . . .”). In addition to our own anecdotal
experiences, the market clearly supports this hypothesis: NPEs overwhelmingly choose to
sue infringers in large, multi-defendant cases, despite the fact that this strategy enables
coordination among defendants. See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying
Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688-89 (2012) (“Unlike productproducing companies, patent trolls commonly employ a litigation strategy of initiating
infringement suits against large numbers of unrelated, geographically diverse defendants
in venues friendly to patent plaintiffs . . . .”); Allison et al., supra note 12, at 700
(“[D]efendants in multiparty patent cases should be more likely to settle out and leave
their competitors holding the bag, particularly because while defendants can share
information, they cannot act jointly in deciding to settle.”).
60
See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8 INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2007); Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 88; Joseph
Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (“[A] challenger bears the cost of
litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the benefits of
successful challenge . . . .”).
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i.

Customers’ Incentives to Litigate

NPEs prefer customer defendants over manufacturers because
customer defendants are generally one-time players61 with little incentive
to help non-parties or stand up to litigation tactics.62 Independent of the
merits of a case, most customer defendants will take whatever option
results in less cost—including a license priced less than the expected cost
of litigation.63
From the standpoint of a one-time-player customer defendant, a single
patent lawsuit bears an expected (negative) value of:

61

Innovatio, for example, targeted many companies that had never before been accused
of patent infringement—for example, eleven separate Chicago-area Marriot hotel
franchises. Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC v. JW Marriot Chicago, No. 1:11-cv-06478
(N.D. Ill.). Lodsys has done the same, accusing numerous first-time alleged infringers
like travel websites Makemytrip.com, Inc. and Vegas.com LLC, used car seller
Drivetime Automotive Group, Inc., and brand manager ForeSee Results, Inc. Lodsys
Group, LLC v. MakeMyTrip.com, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00749 (E.D. Tex.); Lodsys, LLC
v. Adidas America, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00283 (E.D. Tex.); Lodsys, LLC v. DriveTime
Automotive Grp., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00309 (E.D. Tex). To be sure, this characterization
doesn’t apply to all companies who are, strictly speaking, customers of some other
supplier. For example, in the ongoing “smartphone patent wars” between Apple and
Android phone makers, defendants Samsung, HTC, and Motorola Mobility are accused
of infringing patents that allegedly cover various features of the Android operating
system, which is supplied by Google. See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Apple, Samsung,
Google and the Smartphone Patent Wars - Everything You Need to Know, GUARDIAN,
Oct.
22,
2012,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/oct/22/smartphone-patent-wars-explained.
All three phone makers are sued for patent infringement more than a dozen times a year.
PatentFreedom, Most Pursued Companies, at https://www.patentfreedom.com/aboutnpes/pursued/ (last accessed Feb. 19, 2013).
62
Kamprath, supra note 27, at 27; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 125 (1974).
63
Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, Allocation of Legal Costs and Patent Litigation: A
Cooperative Game Approach, at *10 (Univ. of Auckland Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper
Series, 1999), available at http://128.118.178.162/eps/io/papers/9612/9612001.pdf
(noting that defendants are willing to pay plaintiffs more to settle suits as expected
litigation costs increase); Kamprath, supra note 27, at 25 ("With each early settlement,
the patent troll maximizes his profit and minimizes his own litigation costs."). Indeed, as
courts have recognized, license fees “negotiated in the face of a threat of high litigation
costs may be strongly influenced by a desire to avoid full litigation.” Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1164 n.11 (6th Cir. 19780) (quoting
Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889)); see also Richard L. Stroup, Patentee's
Monetary Recovery from an Infringer, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 362, 384 (1977).
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E = (p*(D+C)) – (1-p)(C))

where “E” is the expected value (loss) associated with the case, “p” is the
probability of the plaintiff successfully enforcing its patent, “D” is the
expected damages amount, and “C” is the cost of defense.
Additionally, for any defendant, it is rational to settle a case for an
amount “S” that is less than the expected value of defense:
S<E
Combining both equations, it is straightforward to show that a
customer defendant will rationally settle for less than the cost of defense,
even when faced with an extremely “weak” patent with virtually no
chance of ultimate success (e.g., the patent is almost certainly invalid
and/or not infringed).64 In short, even if p ≈ 0 and therefore E ≈ C,
E = p*(D+C) – (1-p)(C)
lim E = 0*(D+C) – (1-0)(C)
p0

64

This analysis also assumes that a patentee enforcing a weak patent will not be forced to
pay a successful defendant’s attorneys fees or some other amount as a sanction for filing
a frivolous case. Though certainly not unheard of, sanctions against patentees are
exceedingly rare. See supra note 24. It also assumes that customer defendants view
patent infringement allegations as a rare occurrence and, thus, do not benefit from
fighting back simply to build a reputation as a “tough mark.” This assumption holds true
for the customers defendants we have in mind—i.e., the coffee shops sued by Innovatio
and small offices sued by Project Paperless—though of course it will not hold true for
“customer” defendants. See supra note 61. Parties that face NPE claims on a regular
basis may benefit from routinely defending suits (rather than settling them) because precommitting to litigate may deter other patentees looking to file suit against targets
amenable to quick settlements. Companies like Twitter and Newegg have publicly vowed
to fight NPE suits, regardless of the expense involved. See, e.g., Ben Lee, Twitter: It’s
time for patent trolls to bear the costs of frivolous lawsuits, GIGAOM, Oct. 8, 2012, at
http://gigaom.com/2012/10/08/twitter-time-for-trolls-to-pay-full-price-for-patentmischief/ (“[W]e [Twitter] have never agreed to pay to settle a patent suit.”); Joe Mullin,
How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and Saved Online Retail, supra note
21 (“Newegg is unique in its willingness to take on patent troll cases and fight them
through trial.”). As indirect evidence of both propositions, consider Allison, et al.’s
finding that, between 2000 and 2010, NPEs asserted 106 patents in 8 or more cases
each—settling almost 90% of these cases and, when forced to litigate to a judgment,
losing more than 90% of the time. Allison et al., supra note 12, at 689.

19

Draft 15-Mar-13
=C

a defendant will rationally settle for any amount less than the expected
cost of defense.65
S<E=C
A customer defendant, thus, will generally agree to pay royalties even
when the patent-in-suit has virtually no substantive value. 66 Looking to
statistics on the cost of defense in patent suits, customer defendants will
find it rational to pay a pretty penny, too. According to the AIPLA, the
median cost of a medium-sized patent litigation is approximately six
million dollars per party, double the cost reported 2009 and four times the
cost reported in 2001.67
Thus, because customers will generally find it rational to settle with
NPEs holding even incredibly weak patents—and often to settle for six
figure amounts—NPEs will find it profitable to sue as many judgmentproof customers as possible. Statistics bear this out. NPEs in the business
of purchasing patents for assertion sue almost nineteen defendants per
patent they litigate. 68 Nuisance-value NPEs sue even more broadly.
Innovatio, for example, has sued over 200 defendants in 26 suits, once
accusing 80 companies in a single complaint.69 The end result is a flood
of litigation that taxes the federal court system.

65

See Sudarshan, supra note 25, at 161-166 (2008).
See Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 159, 160 (2006);
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV.
1347 (2008) (using a game theoretic model to show how weak patents can be used to
extract royalties that exceed their social value); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why
“Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change? The Private and
Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 77-95 (2006).
67
See supra note 3. When the amount at stake in a patent suit is less than $1 million,
litigation costs will generally exceed the patentee’s possible recover. AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011
at I-155-56. Also, more than half of all patent litigation costs are incurred during
discovery, before a decision on the merits can be rendered. Id.
68
Love, supra note 11, at 29, 33 (finding that, overall, NPEs accuse an average of
twelve infringers per litigated patent, and that NPEs who purchase patents for litigation
accuse almost 19 infringers per patent on average).
69
Results tabulated using LexMachina.com’s search functionality on February 19, 2013.
66
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Manufacturers’ Incentives

Manufacturers are in a different economic position. Compared to their
customers, manufacturers are more likely to take a forward-looking view
of patent litigation. In particular, when deciding whether to litigate or
settle, manufacturers rationally consider their current and future product
offerings, customer populations, and litigation budgets. In short, litigation
is never a one-time affair because the same patentee, or another, may
accuse new products in the future.
As a result, litigation offers unique benefits to a manufacturing
defendant. By defending a suit, the manufacture may be able to nail down
the outer boundaries of the asserted patent through the claim construction
process. Doing so may provide the manufacturer with a strong argument
for non-infringement in the present case or, alternatively, a clear path to
“design around” the patent in future products.70
In addition, a manufacturer may choose to defend a case simply to
send a message to future NPEs. Manufacturers who anticipate similar
suits in the future may be concerned that a quick settlement in the present
case will encourage other NPEs watching the lawsuit to sue the
manufacturer or its customer.71
Together, these factors reduce a patentee’s ability to drive a
manufacturer to settle through litigation costs alone. In other words,
manufacturers will generally perceive a certain positive value associated
with litigating. This transforms the above formula in the following
manner:
E = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-(1/L))

70

Rantanen, supra note 66, at 161.
Id. (there are costs to the infringer of not litigating – other patent trolls may take the
willingness to take a license to the patent “as an invitation to feast.”). Twitter has
publicly refused to settle with patent trolls. Lee, supra note 64 (reporting that Twitter
receives many baseless patent threats and “our policy is to fight them with all our
might . . . . we have never agreed to pay to settle a patent suit”). Newegg also refuses to
settle with patent rolls, recently winning on an appeal that rendered Soverain shopping
cart patents invalid. Jon Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and
Saved Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 27, 2013, available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cartpatent-and-saved-online-retail/.
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where L is the manufacturer’s perceived litigation “discount percentage” –
i.e., the ratio between legal dollars spent in this case and expected future
savings that would flow from a victory against the patentee on the merits
(e.g., 1:2 or 0.5).72
Because of manufacturers’ forward-looking view of litigation, they
will often have sufficient incentive to litigate even exceptionally weak
cases. Even when p ≈ 0, E is a factor of C and L:
E = p*(D+C) – (1-p)(C)*(1-(1/L))
lim E = 0*(D+C) – (1-0)(C)*(1-(1/L))
p0

= C*(1-(1/L))
Thus, when 0 < L < 1, the manufacturer will have an incentive to bear
the cost of defense and litigate the case on the merits. Even when L > 1,
the manufacturer will be less susceptible than a customer to litigation cost
hold-up. Any forward-looking benefit the manufacturer sees to litigation—
even a rather small one—will reduce the amount for which the
manufacturer is willing to settle.
In short, compared to its customers, a manufacturer has considerably
more incentive to mount a defense against allegations of patent
infringement, especially when the patent-in-suit is exceptionally weak. By
permitting patent suits against customers to proceed unimpeded, rather
than permitting manufacturers to step in and litigate on behalf of their
disinterested customers, current case law actually encourages nuisance
suits. Without a strong customer suit exception, strategic strike suit filers
have little to fear if they unexpectedly file a large number of suits against
customer defendants. Without forewarning, manufacturers cannot beat
patentees to the courthouse.73 As a result, manufacturers are left waiting
72

To be clear, this is a grossly oversimplified equation. An infringer may still be able to
cultivate a reputation as a tough litigator, even if it loses from time to time. Likewise, an
accused infringer could lose on the merits of a case but nonetheless cabin the patentee
into a particularly narrow claim construction that is easy to avoid in the future.
73
And some forewarning still isn’t enough to support declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
There must be “sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (holding a
licensee is not required to terminate or breach a license agreement before seeking a
declaratory judgment of patent invalidity).
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in line to litigate, powerlessly watching their customers settle what appear
to be spurious claims.
If courts routinely stayed customer suits to permit willing
manufacturers to litigate first, nuisance suits would instead be discouraged.
At a minimum, strike suit filers would have to strategically target the
customers of manufacturers who lacked the resources or foresight to
litigate on behalf of their customers. And, in the long term, even this
strategy might prove infeasible as customers increasingly purchased from
manufacturers who proved willing to litigate.
In short, as more
manufacturers become willing to litigate, there are fewer targets for
nuisance suits and those targets that remain are less appealing.
Thus, though a more liberal application of the customer suit exception
may increase the number of suits on federal court dockets in the short
term, there is good reason to believe it would lead to fewer nuisance suits
in the long term.
B. Manufacturers Are Better Positioned To Defend Infringement
Claims on the Merits
In addition to a myopic view of the customer suit exception’s impact
on judicial economy, Federal Circuit precedent also fails to properly
weigh—indeed, to give weight to at all—other benefits of permitting
manufacturers to defend patent suits. One benefit is a manufacturer’s
greater technical capacity and, thus, enhanced ability to vigorously litigate
the merits of a patent case.
As the entity actually developing products in the field of the asserted
patent, the manufacturer is the company best positioned to litigate the
merits of a case enforcing that patent. Using in-house knowledge of the
accused technology, a manufacturer can generate non-infringement
arguments and identify “design around” options. Likewise, relying on
employees who have worked in the field of the invention for a substantial
period of time, a manufacture is best able to identify potential prior art.
Consider a customer defendant and a manufacturer defendant who
have similar incentives to litigate a non-frivolous case (i.e., p > 0)
without regard to the case’s impact on future suit (i.e., when the
manufacturer’s L is very large).
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EC = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C
EM = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-(1/L))
lim EM = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-(1/ ∞))
L∞

= p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-0)
= p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C
= EC
In this scenario, S is a factor of p, D, and C for customers and
manufacturers.
S < EM = EC = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C
Assuming that the cost of defense is relatively similar for both parties,74
the financial transfer that will result from the case is driven by the
patentee’s likelihood of success and potential damages award.
Social welfare is maximized—or, rather, deadweight loss resulting
from the patent system is minimized—when litigation accurately values
patented inventions.75 Thus, it is in society’s best interest for infringement
74

Litigation costs in civil suits are highly correlated with the amount at stake in a suit,
not with the type of defendant facing those stakes. See Emery G. Lee & Thomas E.
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765,
772 (2010) (“Our findings indicate that the monetary stakes in the litigation represent the
primary cost driver in most civil litigation”). Patent suits are no exception. See
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2011, at I-155-56 (reporting mean litigation costs as a factor of the amount at
stake in the case).
75
See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8 Innovation
Policy and the Economy 111, 111 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf (“[E]xcessive patentee rewards are socially
costly as they raise the deadweight loss associated with the patent system and discourage
innovation by others.”); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual
Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 214 (1999)
(“If the system overcompensates the inventor, the protection may actually impede
innovation by denying competitors (and users) access to needed information and basic
inventions that could serve as building blocks for further progress. In short, because
competition also plays a role in fostering innovation, overprotection of a patent holder
from competition may perversely result in less, rather than more, innovation.”).
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defense to be handled by the party best suited to test the patent-in-suit’s
validity, scope, and value.76
As between a similarly situated customer and manufacturer, it is
virtually always the manufacturer who is best suited to vigorously litigate
the case in a manner that challenges the patent’s validity and delineates its
claim scope. The classic target for a patent troll is a company outside the
technology industry who merely purchases the accused technology.
Unlike the manufacturer, these companies have no expertise in the accused
technology. They were not involved in the design, development or
manufacture of the accused technology. They have no understanding of
the field of the patent and no knowledge of the prior art to the patent.
When the patent relates to a component within a larger system, customers
may not even be aware of the accused technology or understand what role
it plays in the overall system.
By contrast, manufacturers are well situated to litigate the merits of a
patent suit because they possess in-house knowledge and expertise relevant
to the patent-in-suit’s validity. It was the manufacturer’s employees, after
all, who designed, developed, and initially sold the product or component
embodying the accused technology. These individuals meet or exceed the
qualifications of a “person having of ordinary skill in the art” and, thus,
can provide ready insight into a patent’s vulnerabilities.77

76

Society’s interest is surprisingly strong. A large percentage of patented inventions are
later deemed unworthy of protection, and a large percentage of patent allegations are
later proven to be unwarranted. Patent claims adjudicated on the merits are invalidated
about 55 percent of the time. Benjamin Hershkowitz, What Are My Chances? From Idea
Through
Litigation,
FIND
LAW,
Oct.
16,
2003,
available
at
http://immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/GENREF/F031016H.pdf.
Moreover, patentees prove infringement only about 40 percent of the time their
allegations are tested in court. Id. Overall, only about 30 percent of patent claims
litigated to a decision on the merits are found both valid and infringed. Id.
77
In many contexts, patent law asks courts and juries to view the patented invention and
other technology from the perspective of a “person having ordinary skill in the art.” See
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (obviousness: “[T]he
test of obviousness . . . [is] whether the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains . . . .”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(claim construction: “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at
the time of the invention . . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (enablement: requiring that a patent’s
specification “contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear,
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Specifically, a manufacturer’s in-house knowledgebase is a valuable
source of prior art and expert analysis. Manufacturers are generally
familiar with the history of their own product offerings as well as the
history of the industry writ large. As a result, manufacturers frequently
can locate prior art that even the most sophisticated third-party prior art
searchers cannot. For example, manufacturers generally have historical
records of products sold or offered for sale prior to the patent-in-suit’s
priority date, as well as access to engineers’ notebooks or other materials
that may establish a conception date for the accused technology that
antedates the patent’s. In addition, manufacturers have greater exposure
to other sources of non-traditional prior art like demonstrations at trade
shows and presentations at academic or industry conferences.78
Manufacturers’ in-house expertise is also helpful in establishing noninfringement. Employees of the manufacturer are intimately familiar with
the accused technology and have ready access to detailed design
specifications.79 Customer defendants, on the other hand, generally gain
access to this information, if at all, indirectly through expensive thirdparty expert witnesses.
Without employees of their own who are knowledgeable about the
accused technology, customer defendants must look elsewhere for
technical information that manufacturers have at their fingertips. The
highly confidential nature of technical information regarding the accused
product further complicates this process. Manufacturers are reluctant to
entrust confidential design information with any third-party, even their

concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use
the same . . . .”).
78
See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating a patent in
light of prior art briefly displayed at a conference).
79
Cf. Tore Markeset & Uday Kumar, Design and Development of Product Support and
Maintenance Concepts for Industrial Systems, JOURNAL OF QUALITY IN MAINTENANCE
ENGINEERING, Vol. 9 Iss. 4, at 376 (2003) (“The specification process is often a result of
interaction between the manufacturer and the industrial customer, while the design
specification implementation process is the responsibility of the manufacturer.”).
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customers, for fear of jeopardizing their trade secret rights 80 and of
attracting additional patent suits81 should that information become public.
Confidentiality concerns also narrow the pool of experts available to
work with customer defendants. Manufacturers, for example, will almost
certainly refuse to share confidential information with technical personnel
presently working in the industry—i.e., for a competitor—thereby
excluding most industry specialists from serving as expert witnesses.
Likewise, if it is not clear that the manufacturer will agree to indemnify,
customers may be reluctant to turn over the reins of preparing expert
reports and testimony to the manufacturer for fear that the manufacturer’s
employees will be loyal first and foremost to their employer, not its
customer. Even when indemnity is assured, customers who foresee using
other manufacturers’ designs in the future may want to keep expert
witnesses on a short lease to ensure that their positions do not exonerate
their present supplier at the expense of their future supplier. The end
result is that customer defendants generally hire academics or
“professional expert” witnesses who are no longer actively working in the
field of the invention and who may be attacked in court as “hired guns.”82
80

Trade secret law only protects information that is “not . . . generally known.”
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i) (1985). Information loses its protected status once it
is publicized, even if that disclosure was made by a third-party. See, e.g., Religious
Tech. Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that stolen
information posted online was no longer protectable as a trade secret).
81
For example, manufacturers who are frequent targets of patent suits are reluctant to
release technical information that might be used by the plaintiff, or other patentees, to
identify additional patents that could be enforced down the road against the manufacturer
or its customers. Manufacturers are also worry about “submarine patenting.” See, e.g.,
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 425-26
(2012) (“Using (or perhaps abusing) the continuation process, it is surprisingly simple for
a patentee to win claims covering products and technology introduced into the market
well after her original application was filed. This practice [is] sometimes called
‘submarine patenting’ . . . .”). In other words, they worry that the plaintiff or another
patentee might have pending patent applications that can be modified on the basis of
disclosed technical information so that they precisely cover the manufacturer’s products.
Customer defendants that don’t produce products are not familiar with these concerns and,
thus, are less likely than manufacturers to safeguard against these threats—for example,
by including a “patent prosecution bar” in protective orders. See James Juo & David J.
Pitman, A Prosecution Bar in Patent Litigation Should Be the Exception Rather than the
Rule, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 42, 43 (2010) (“[A] prosecution bar . . . prohibit[s] attorneys
who receive the disclosing party‘s confidential information from prosecuting patents on
behalf of the receiving party.”).
82
See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current
Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 253 (2001) (arguing that
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C. Manufacturers Are Better Positioned To Value Patent Rights

Another benefit the Federal Circuit’s test ignores is the manufacturer’s
ability to negotiate a settlement consistent with the value of the patented
technology and financial realities of the field of the invention. For many
of the same reasons manufacturers are best suits to argue the merits of
patent claims, manufacturers are also uniquely positioned to ensure that
damages awarded for infringement align with the actual value of the
patented technology. Compared to individual customers, a manufacturer
is more likely to possess information relevant to reasonable royalty
calculations, more likely to correctly apportion value between patented
and unpatented features, and less likely to collude with the patentee to the
detriment of future accused infringers.
First, manufacturers generally have in-house knowledge of the
financial realities of the industry, including industry-standard licensing
rates and practices, as well as the value of (or cost-savings attributable to)
the accused technology, including how it compares with potential
alternatives. 83 These considerations are directly relevant to calculating
reasonable royalty damages, typically the only remedy an NPE can hope
for.84
professional experts are perversely incentivized to testify positively for the party who
hires them because experts cannot be held accountable in tort or contract law by the
opposing party). To be effective, these experts generally must obtain information from
other third-parties who are actively working in industry. Often, the only avenue to
obtain this information is depositions, which are very structured, occasionally adversarial,
generally limited in time and scope, and thus far from an ideal method of gathering
information.
83
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that reasonable royalty damages should take into consideration
“[t]he utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any,
that had been used for working out similar results” and “[t]he portion of the profit or of
the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable
businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions”).
84
NPEs cannot seek "lost profit" damages because they typically do not manufacture or
sell products that compete with products accused of infringement. See Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). Moreover,
because the NPEs are in the business of collecting royalties, they frequently cannot
satisfy the "irreparable harm" prong of 4-factor test for an injunction. See, e.g., Lily
Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Reconstructed, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 798 (2009) (noting that between May 2006 and
October 2008 just three permanent injunctions were issued in NPE cases, while 39 were
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Under the Georgia-Pacific standard, reasonable royalty damages must
be set at a rate that takes into account, among other considerations:
The rates paid by the [infringer] for the use of other patents
comparable to the patent in suit . . . . The effect of selling
the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the [infringer] . . . . The established profitability of the
product made under the patent . . . . The utility and
advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar
results . . . . [T]he benefits to those who have used the
invention . . . . The portion of the profit or of the selling
price that may be customary in the particular business or in
comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention
or analogous inventions . . . . The portion of the realizable
profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements . . . or
significant features or improvements added by the
infringer.85
For each category of evidence listed above, it is the infringing
product’s manufacturer, rather than one purchaser, who is in the best
position to marshal evidence of the patent’s value. A customer involved
issued in cases between product-producing companies). In any event, reasonable
royalties is the predominant form of damages in patent cases. See PWC PATENT
LITIGATION STUDY 12 (reporting that from 2002-2009 reasonable royalties were awarded
in 77.9% of patent cases where damages were awarded).
85
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. Patentees who cannot prove that they are
entitled to lost profit damages—frequently because they do not sell a product, let alone
one covered by their patent—may recover as damages only the reasonable royalty for
which they could have licensed their patent to the infringer. See 35 U.S.C. § 284
(permitting court to award “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer”). In setting this reasonable royalty rate, courts attempt to reconstruct the
hypothetical bargain that the parties would have negotiated had they willingly tried to do
so at the time infringement began. See Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1157-58 (“A reasonable
royalty is an amount which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article,
as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make
and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.” (quoting Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937))).
To recreate this “willing licensor-willing licensee” royalty, courts generally rely on the
fifteen factors set forth in Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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in a one-off patent suit is unlikely to have licensed a patent before, let
alone one comparable to the patent-in-suit. 86 The manufacturer, on the
other hand, may have licensed many, both as licensor and licensee.
A customer likewise has far less evidence related to sales made along
with the patented technology and the benefits associated with its use. A
customer is intimately familiar with its own decision to purchase and
anticipated benefits, but a manufacturer generally will be familiar with the
needs, preferences, and willingness to pay of its entire customer base and
may well have already commissioned industry-wide surveys on these
topics.87
In addition, a manufacturer is generally in a better position to
apportion value between patented and unpatented88 features of the product
and to estimate the value of the patented features compared to the next
best alternative. First, a manufacturer is better able to determine the
fraction of its revenue attributable to non-patented features of its product
and the fraction attributable to the invention claimed in the asserted patent.
Again, though a customer is intimately familiar with its own valuation of
the product it purchased and its (potentially) myriad features, a
manufacturer generally will be familiar with the aggregate preferences of
its entire customer base and likely possesses previously-acquired data on
these topics. The manufacturer is also better equipped to discover,
catalogue, and value non-infringing alternative technology. Though the
customer may have shopped around and become familiar with some
alternatives to the product it purchased, the manufacturer possesses inhouse expertise in the field of the invention and is, thus, far betterequipped to design-around the patent by designing a non-infringing
86

See supra note 61.
See, e.g., Darrell Rigby, Management Tools Survey 2003: Usage Up as Companies
Strive to Make Headway in Tough Times, STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP vol. 31, iss. 5, at 6
(2003) (“Of the respondents, 78 percent said they use [customer relationship management]
systems, compared with 35 percent in 2000. Customer surveys and customer
segmentation strategies both landed in the top ten in terms of usage and satisfaction.”);
PAUL HAGUE ET AL., MARKET RESEARCH IN PRACTICE 4 (2004) (explaining that effective
market research generates data on: customers’ “likelihood of adoption of new products,”
“customer satisfaction” with existing products, and customers’ “unmet needs”).
88
“Unpatented” in the sense that the features or components are not covered by the patent
at issue in the case—not that they are completely unpatented. This convention is also
followed in the case law. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (explicitly defining “unpatented” as “not covered by the patent in suit”).
Components of a complex device may, of course, be covered by a multitude of patents.
See infra note 91.
87
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version.89 In fact, the manufacturer may well sell a non-infringing version
of the accused product and, thereby, have ready access to data reflecting
the value added by the patented version.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, manufacturers have a practical
advantage over entities below them on the supply chain when it comes to
damages apportionment: they sell the smallest infringing unit. 90 As
products move down the supply chain they often become components of
larger, complex devices, rather than products in their own right. Devices
purchased by end users often incorporate hundreds or thousands, and
sometimes even hundreds of thousands of individually patented
inventions.91
Fortunately for patentees (and unfortunately for accused infringers),
the larger and more complex the accused device is relative to the patented
89

For example, in litigation between Apple and companies selling phones using Google’s
Android mobile operating system, it was Android creator Google (rather than customer
defendants like Samsung and HTC) that developed noninfringing alternatives to some of
Apple’s software patents. See, e.g., Brad Reed, How Google Reworked Android to Step
Around
Apple’s
Deadly
’915
Patent,
BGR,
Aug.
30,
2012,
at
http://bgr.com/2012/08/30/apple-patent-analysis-google-android/.
90
Chao, supra note 26, at 115 (finding that damages awards should be smaller if the
patentee chooses to sue the manufacturer because “[u]nder the current system of
permissive apportionment, attorneys representing the manufacturer will point out that the
patented invention is only [a] small part of a much larger product. Moreover, these
arguments will be buttressed by instructions from the judge that incorporates the
thirteenth Georgia-Pacific factor.”).
91
According to a study by patent aggregator RPX, the average smartphone incorporates
about 250,000 patented inventions. See RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1)
59
(Sept.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/dsl.htm (“Based
on our research, we believe that there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to
today’s smartphones . . . . .”). See also Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin:
Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 307, 341 (2006) (“‘[S]oftware and computers are examples of ‘system’
products—they comprise thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of individually
functioning components and features all assembled in a package for a customer. Because
many of these features could be the subjects of a patent, it is often the case that thousands
of patents may be relevant to a particular computer or software product.’” (quoting
Patent Quality Improvement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) (statement of
Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple Computer, Inc., on behalf of the
Business Software Alliance))); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007) (“[M]odern products such as
microprocessors, cell phones, or memory devices can easily be covered by dozens or
even hundreds of different patents.”).
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technology, the larger damages awards tend to be. In many situations,
patentees are overcompensated—and socially-valuable, but potentiallyinfringing, commercialization is over-deterred—as a result. 92
Overcompensation occurs for at least two interrelated reasons. For one,
the larger the accused device, the harder it is for jurors to distinguish
between value attributable to the patented invention and value attributable
to other features and components.93 Second, the “anchoring” effect of the
larger sales price of a larger device, allows patentees to ask for larger
damages amounts without appearing unreasonable.94 The cumulative result
is that reasonable royalty awards tend to hover around 10-15% of the
revenue of the accused product, regardless of the complexity of that
product relative to the patented invention.95 Naturally, given the choice,
the owner of a patent related to 3G wireless technology would prefer to
pursue 10-15% of a $600 smartphone, rather than 10-15% of the $6.50
3G wireless chipset installed therein.96
Manufacturer suits dampen both value-skewing effects. Manufacturers
often sell a smaller device than the one end-users ultimately purchase.
With fewer components to distinguish, apportionment is easier. Likewise,
with fewer components, revenue totals are smaller and consequently
anchoring has less impact.
Finally (and perhaps surprisingly), once a customer decides to settle, it
has a strong incentive to actually help the patentholder game the system
for awarding patent damages. The reason is simple: defending a patent
suit generates uncompensated positive externalities. 97 A customer

92

See Chao, supra note 26, at 99.
Id. at 111-113.
94
Id. at 115-118.
95
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 91, at 2034-35 (analyzing all reasonable royalty
damages awards reported in Westlaw between 1982 and February 2005 that could be
calculated as a percentage of the sale price of infringing units, and finding that reasonable
royalty rates averaged 13.1% of sales during their study period – well above the average
profit margin of just 8.3%).
96
For example, an unlocked iPhone 4S currently retails for almost $600, see
http://www.amazon.com/Apple-iPhone-4S-16GB-Black/dp/B006FMDVDK, while the
wireless chipset it includes costs about $6.50, see iPhone 4S Component Costs Once
Again
Begin
at
About
$188,
MACRUMORS,
Oct.
20,
2011,
at
http://www.macrumors.com/2011/10/20/iphone-4s-component-costs-once-again-begin-atabout-188/.
97
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative
93
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defendant bears the cost of defense, but shares the benefits of invalidating
or narrowing a patent with all its competitors. As a result, a customer
defendant has less than socially-optimal incentive to litigate, and instead
once sued actually has an incentive to see its competitors also bear the cost
of a patent suit. Accordingly, NPEs commonly kickoff a patent
enforcement campaign by first targeting weak customer defendants in
order to obtain favorable settlements or court victories that will set an
initial “market price” for the patent moving forward. 98 Customer
defendants are routinely complicit in this process and may, for example,
willingly settle for an artificially high royalty rate applied to an artificially
small quantity of sales in hopes that their competitors will later pay the
same rate on all their revenue.99
III.

EXPANDING THE CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION

For all these reasons, the current test for applying the customer suit
exception fails to consider the full range of costs of customer litigation and
benefits of manufacturer litigation. As a result, current caselaw fails to
achieve a socially-optimal balance between patentees’ rights to enforce
their patents and society’s interest in policing and properly valuing
patented inventions. Fortunately, existing doctrine is easily salvageable.
Courts are looking in the right direction, but with an unduly narrow focus.
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (“[A] challenger
bears the cost of litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the
benefits of successful challenge . . . .”).
98
Settlement rates and reasonable royalty damages not only affect the parties involved in
the litigation but also impact the entire industry. A judicial finding of patent infringement,
validity and damages has an enormous impact on the value of a patent and the royalties
that may be collected by patent holders. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 80-81 (“The distribution of value
of patents appears to be highly skewed, with the top 1% of patents more than a thousand
times as valuable as the median patent. Many patents are virtually worthless, either
because they cover technology that is not commercially important, because they are
impossible to enforce effectively, or because they are very unlikely to hold up if litigated
and thus cannot be asserted effectively.”). Favorable litigation outcomes often set the
"market price" for the patent because potential infringers are deterred from challenging a
patent that has been battle-tested. See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 23,
at *5 (“Small companies increase the returns to patent assertion when they legitimize
PAE patents, regardless of their validity, by agreeing to royalty-based settlements.”).
99
See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 23, at *5 (noting that “small
companies are being used by PAEs to secure venue and early settlements to feed the war
chest”).
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Accordingly, we recommend that courts expand existing doctrine as
follows.
First, we recommend that courts begin applying the customer suit
exception (at least to a limited extent) on a patent-by-patent and
manufacturer-by-manufacturer basis, rather than on a case-by-case basis.
To do otherwise is to render the doctrine a virtual nullity. Current
caselaw limits the doctrine’s application to circumstances where customer
defendants are “mere resellers” of the technology produced by one
manufacturer. 100 As a result, the doctrine is easily circumvented by
adding a customer-specific claim or suing a batch of customers who
collectively use the technology of more than one manufacturer.101
At a minimum, we suggest that courts apply the customer suit exception
(i) when the patentee’s infringement allegations are primarily directed at a
manufacturer’s technology and no more than nominally at technology
added by the customer defendants themselves, and (ii) if customers of
multiple manufacturers are joined, when there are no more than nominal
questions of fact common to all customer defendants. This proposed rule,
which draws on traditional principles of “improper joinder”102 as well as
new joinder rules applicable in patent suits following enactment of the
America Invents Act, 103 would prevent patentees from strategically
avoiding the doctrine by adding trivial customer-specific claims or claims
against customers of other manufacturers, and would instead give courts
discretion to apply the customer suit exception when doing so would
clearly advance the interests of judicial economy.
Second, we recommend that courts whether the exception will advance
judicial economy in a particular case, consider more than just the shortterm consequences of such a ruling. Current doctrine asks only whether
applying the exception will reduce the number of already-filed suits,
without regard to whether it might reduce the number of suits filed in the
future.104 Instead, courts should take a broader view of judicial economy
that additionally considers whether applying the exception will lead to
100

See supra note 54.
Id.
102
See, e.g., Salazar v. Allstate Texas Lloyd's, Inc., 455 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“In the paradigmatic fraudulent joinder case, a plaintiff sues a nominal nondiverse/instate defendant along with a diverse foreign defendant in an effort to make sure that its
claims against the diverse defendant stay in state court.”)
103
See supra note 6.
104
See supra note 53.
101
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fewer case filings down the road. In other words, courts should consider
the nature of the litigation before them—i.e., whether or not it appears to
be part of a large enforcement campaign against users of technology—and,
thus, the likelihood that one (or even a small handful of) manufacturer
suits will stop future suits from being filed or significantly reduce
litigation costs by, for example, simplifying discovery. Additionally,
courts should consider whether applying the customer suit exception in the
instant case is likely to deter other patentees from endeavoring to sue a
multitude of customer defendants, when it would be possible to instead sue
a solvent manufacturer.
Finally, we recommend that courts add an additional factor to the test:
rather than focusing exclusively on judicial economy, courts should
additionally consider society’s interest in enforcing the quid pro quo
underlying the patent system. 105 Specifically, courts should weigh the
relative abilities of the manufacturer and customers involved in the instant
suit to defend against the patentee’s claims. This consideration should
include the parties’ respective knowledge of and access to information
relevant to the patent’s validity, the specific components or features
accused of infringement, and the calculation of damages, including
alternatives and industry licensing practices.
CONCLUSION
Nuisance value litigation harms everyone, and enriches no one, except
those who pursue it. With patent-fueled strike suits on the rise, and
meaningful legislative reforms out of reach, courts and accused infringers
need common law “self-help” solutions now more than ever. 106
105

See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142
(2001) (“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to
exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)));
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo ... for granting
a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 23 (1829) (noting that if an invention is already
commonly known and used when a patent is sought, “there might be sound reason for
presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the
absence of a “quid pro quo.”).
106
See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 387-90
(2012) (arguing that historical examples suggest that legislative efforts to reform the
patent system generally fail, while “self-help” mechanisms like tacit industry-wide
coordination against patent abuses have generally succeeded).
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Fortunately, a promising solution has been lurking in the forgotten
recesses of patent caselaw for decades. Though unduly limited in its
current incarnation, the customer suit exception is, in spirit, just what the
patent system needs: a procedural vehicle that ensures the entity best
suited to test a patent gets a shot at doing so. Updating the doctrine to
account for the complexity of modern technology might just be enough to
stop the next Innovatio or Lodsys before it ever files a suit.

